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LEGISLATION
THE 1977 MARYLAND WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a comprehensive Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act,l patterned after
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 2
Consolidating prior wiretapping .and bugging provisions in the
Maryland Code, the 1977 Maryland law expands the permitted use of
participant monitoring and provides a civil remedy for violations
under the Act. This article will trace the history of Maryland
wiretapping and electronic surveillance laws, contrasting the present Act with previous Maryland law and with corresponding federal
provisions. Suggestions for clarification 'and changes to the Act will
be drawn from various sources.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Federal History in a Nutshell
During the first half of this century, the Supreme Court did not
regard wiretapping as a search and seizure within the context of the
fourth amendment, since wiretapping could be conducted without
physical invasion of person or property.3 In handing down its
landmark decision in Katz v. United States, 4 the Court not only
rejected the physical invasion theory, but laid the groundwork for
enactment the following year of a comprehensive federal wiretapping statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968.5 The Katz Court refused to "retroactively validate"6 an
unauthorized wiretap even though the investigating agents had
carefully circumscribed their search. Only if a magistrate issued a
pre-search order establishing precise limits for the search, and was
later informed of all that had been "seized" would the agents'
conduct be proper under the fourth amendment.?

1. Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 692, 1977 Md. Laws 2798.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520 (1970).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Title III).
389 U.S. at 356.
Wiretapping would be found to be permissible where conducted "in response to a
detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense
... for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the
affidavit's allegations." Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966)
(emphasis added).
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In Berger v. New York,s the Court set exacting guidelines for
constitutional wiretapping and electronic surveillance,9 many of
which were adopted by Title III. Included among the Berger
requirements were:
(1) a neutral magistrate;
(2) a warrant stating with particularity the specific
crime which had been or was being committed and the type
of conversation sought;
(3) an authorization period of less than two months;
(4) a showing of probable cause for extensions of the
authorization period;
(5) a termination date for interception set for the date
on which the conversation sought is obtained;
(6) a giving of notice to the subject of the wiretap or a
showing of exigent circumstances justifying the failure to
give notice; and
(7) a return of the warrant and all seized materials to
the issuing magistrate.
B. Early Maryland History

Well before the turn of the century, Maryland felt compelled to
enact legislation of its own to protect against unnecessary intrusion
into its citizens' privacy.lO The common law crime of sitting under
the eaves of a house to overhear the latest gossip became a more
serious and less discoverable offense with the development of
electronic communications systems. II
Since 1868, Maryland has provided criminal penalties for
telegraph company employees who divulged the contents of
messages. I2 With the arrival of the telephone, the law was expanded

8. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
9. Electronic surveillance, as distinguished from wiretapping, is not restricted to
interception of telephone conversations; rather, it includes any interception of
oral communications through means of an electronic device.
10. See, e.g., Act of March 30, 1868, ch. 471 § 135, 1868 Md. Laws 911 (current version
at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 556 (1976».
11. Due to the rapid growth of technology, many electronic eavesdropping devices
have been developed that could not have been foreseen by the drafters of early
electronic surveillance legislation. Consequently, there has been much litigation
over whether such items as pen registers (devices which record the telephone
numbers dialed from a particular line) are within the purview of state and federal
laws. The Supreme Court recently set the question to rest for future federal cases
in United States v. New York Telephone Co., in which the Court held that pen
registers were not covered by Title III. 98 S. Ct. 364 (1977). See also Dowling,
Bumper Beepers and the Fourth Amendment, 13 CRIM. L. BUL. 266 (1977)
(discussing radio devices used to track moving automobiles); Hodges, Electronic
Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother?,
3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261 (1976) (discussing visual surveillance methods).
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 556 (1976) (repealed 1977).
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to penalize individuals "connected with any telegraph or telephone
corporation, company or individuals operating said lines for profit in
this State, either as clerk, operator, messenger, or in any other
capacity, who shall wilfully divulge the contents or nature of the
contents of any private communication entrusted to him for
transmission or delivery."13 The penalty for violation of Maryland's
early eavesdropping law was a maximum three months imprisonment or a $500 fine or both.
Despite such legislative exhortations against the interception of
private communications, evidence procured through means of
wiretapping has not always been inadmissible in Maryland courts.
In Hitzelberger v. State,14 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
evidence obtained by wiretapping could be admitted, even though a
Maryland law 15 expressly made evidence derived from an illegal
search and seizure inadmissible in a trial of misdemeanors. The
Hitzelberger court based its holding on the absence of language in
the Bouse Act 16 specifically referring to the interception of wire
communiGations. 17
Like the early Supreme Court cases, the Hitzelberger court
adopted the stance that investigation by wiretapping did not violate
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures.1 8 Similarly, the interception was not made illegal by
Congressional enactment of the Federal Communications Act of
1934,19 which proscribed interception of wire communications. The
Hitzelberger court observed that the federal Act applied only to
interstate or foreign communications. Five years later in Weiss v.
United States,20 the Supreme Court expanded the Federal Communications Act to prohibit the interception of intrastate as well as
interstate communications. 21 Even though the Weiss court broadened the reach of the federal Act, the Maryland Court of Appeals in
13. Act of April 10, 1900, ch. 610, § 252, 1900 Md. Laws 941 (current version at MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 556 (1976).
14. 174 Md. 152, 197 A. 605 (1938).
15. Bouse Act, ch. 194, 1929 Md. Laws 533.
16. [d.
17. Accord, Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 285,23 A.2d 706, 709 (1942). The Act stated in
part, that
[n]o evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be deemed admissible
where the same shall have been procured by, through, or in consequence
of any illegal search or seizure, ... nor ... if procured by, through or in
consequence of a search and seizure, the effect of the admission of which
would be to compel one to give evidence against himself in a criminal
case.
Bouse Act, ch. 194, § 4A, 1929 Md. Laws 533.
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
19. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
20. 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
21. See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (derivative evidence also
inadmissible); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (evidence obtained
in violation of Federal Communications Act inadmissible in federal court).
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McGuire v. State 22 commented that messages made inadmissible in
federal court were not automatically made inadmissible in a
Maryland court. 23
Not until the mid-1950's did Maryland have statutory guidelines
for court-ordered wiretapping and admissibility of wiretapping
evidence. In 1956, the Maryland General Assembly passed the
Maryland Wiretapping Act,24 which set standards for all stateconducted wiretapping. Together with the subsequently-adopted
Title III federal requirements 25 and the Maryland Electronic
Surveillance Act,26 the Maryland Wiretapping Act remained the
state's governing law for more than twenty years. Announcing the
policy against the "interception and divulgence of a private
communication by any person not a party thereto ... except by
court order in unusual circumstances,"27 the Act declared that
"detection of the guilty does not justify investigative methods which
infringe upon the liberties of the innocent."2B
Under the 1956 Act, telephonic or telegraphic communications
could be intercepted only upon ap'plication to a circuit court judge or
judge of the Baltimore City Supreme Bench by the attorney general
or a state's attorney. The applicant was required to set forth
circumstances necessitating a wiretap and to state reasonable
grounds for believing that "a crime has been ... or is about to be
committed"29 or that "evidence will be obtained essential to the
solution of such crime."30 The Act further required a showing that
there' were no other means readily available for obtaining the
information other than through wiretapping. If the statements made
in the application were based solely on "information and belief,"31
the applicant had to give grounds for his belief. To insure minimum
infringement upon privacy, the particular telephone or telegraph line
from which information was obtained had to be identified as fully as
possible. For the same reason, no order could be effective longer than
thirty days, after which time it could be renewed or continued for
another thirty-day period upon application by the same officer who

22. 200 Md. 601, 92 A.2d 582 (1952).
23. According to the McGuire court, the federal statute is " 'presumed to be limited in
effect to the federal jurisdiction and not to supersede a state's exercise of its
police power unless there be clear manifestation to the contrary.''' Id. at 607, 92
A.2d at 584 (quoting Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 16, 68
N.E.2d 854, 855 (1946».
24. Wiretapping Act, ch. 116, 1956 Md. Laws 294 (repealed and recodified 1973).
25. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212,
ch. 119 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970».
26. Electronic Surveillance Act, ch. 706, 1959 Md. Laws 1065 (repealed 1977).
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 92 (1971) (repealed and recodified 1973).
28. [d.
29. [d. § 94(a)(1).
30. [d. § 94(a)(2).
31. [d. § 94(b).
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originally secured the warrant. For failure to comply with the
requirements of the Act in obtaining evidence, that evidence would
be rendered inadmissible in court, and the violator subjected to a
possible fine of $1,000 or maximum sentence of ninety days, or
both. 32
In Manger v. State,33 the first case interpreting the 1956
Wiretapping Act, police conducted a wiretap on a telephone to
monitor incoming bets on horse races. The police obtained a search
warrant for the premises and subsequently arrested the appellants,
who contended at trial that all information illegally obtained in the
wiretap had to be excluded from admission into evidence. Rejecting
the appellants' contention, the court explained that they had no
standing to complain since they were not participants in the
overheard conversations. Their situation was compared to that of
persons who, by virtue of holding no proprietary interest in the
premises searched, had no standing to charge police with an illegal
search and seizure. 34
The next Maryland case decided under the 1956 wiretapping
statute, Robert v. State,35 declared that the admissibility of evidence
derived from the wiretap of an interstate telephone. call was not
controlled solely by the Federal Communications Act. Holding that
the federal statute was applicable to intrastate as well as interstate
calls, the court emphasized that the federal Act has not preempted
the field. 36 The court cited Schwartz v. Texas 37 for the proposition
that evidence obtained in violation of the federal Act may be
admitted in a state prosecution if permitted by state law. According
to the Robert court, the supremacy clause created no conflict between
federal and state acts. The state Act, the court commented, "simply
excludes evidence obtained in violation of the state statute, which
would otherwise be admissible . . . notwithstanding the Federal
Act."38
In Robert, the police listened to a conversation by means of a
headset connected with a hotel telephone switchboard, without
obtaining the consent of the parties or complying with the
32. Essentially the same penalty was added to Article 27 of the 1957 Cumulative
Supplement of the Maryland Code at § 670A. Those persons subject to penalties
were "[alny [one] who shall wilfully intercept or tap any telephone or telegraphic
communication in any manner other than pursuant to an order under the
provisions of §§ 100 to 107 ... of Article 35." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 670A
(Cum. Supp. 1957) (repealed 1977).
33. 214 Md. 71, 133 A.2d 78 (1957).
34. See Rizzo v. State, 201 Md. 206, 209-10, 93 A.2d 280, 281-82 (1952); Baum v.
State, 163 Md. 153, 161 A. 244, 245 (1932). But cf, United States v. Ramsey, 503
F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1974) (a family member or other regular user of a telephone
may have standing at a minimization hearing).
35. 220 Md. 159, 151 A.2d 737 (1959).
36. Id. at 168, 151 A.2d at 741 (citing Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957».
37. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
38. 220 Md. at 168-69, 151 A.2d at 741.
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wiretapping statute's requirement of a prior court order. The court
stressed that the statute required the consent of all participants,39
basing its conclusion largely on the legislative history of the Act.
Before passage into law, language in the bill requiring consent of "at
least one of the participants" was amended to require consent of "the
participants."4o
In 1959 the General Assembly added sections 125A-C to Article
27, making it
unlawful for any person in this State to use any electronic
device or equipment of any type whatsoever in such manner
as to overhear or record any part of the conversation or
words spoken to or by any person in private conversation
without the knowledge or consent, express or implied, of that
other person. 41
Thus, the scope of eavesdropping requiring a prior court order was
expanded to encompass devices not commonly used in connection
with telephone or telegraph lines.
The procedures for obtaining a court order for use of an
electronic eavesdropping device differed somewhat from those
required for receiving permission to tap telephone or telegraph lines.
Under section 125A(b), a law enforcement officer who found that a
crime "[had] been or [was] being or [would] be committed"42 and that
the use of the electronic device was "necessary" to prevent the crime
or to apprehend the criminals, was required to submit evidence in
support of his contention to a State's Attorney. Mter passing on the
evidence presented, the State's Attorney was to apply to a circuit
court judge or Baltimore City Supreme Bench judge for an order
authorizing use of the device. Rather than having to show only that
there were "no other means readily available for obtaining such
information"43 as required for a wiretap order, the State's Attorney
also had to demonstrate that use of the device was "necessary" to
prevent commission of or to obtain evidence of the crime. Applying
the rule of statutory construction that ordinary words will be given
their plain and ordinary meaning, "necessary" has been defined as
"that which cannot be dispensed with, essential, indispensable."44
39. Id. at 171, 151 A.2d at 743 (emphasis added).
40.Id.
41. Electronic Surveillance Act, ch. 706, 1959 Md. Laws 1065 (emphasis added)
(codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A (1976) (repealed 1977».
42. Id. The Attorney General was not authorized to apply for an order under the
electronic surveillance statute as he had been under the wiretapping statute.
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 94(a)(3) (1971) (repealed and recodified 1973).
44. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 980 (College ed. 1962). But see BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1181 (4th ed. 1968): "This word must be considered in the
transaction in which it is used, as it is a word susceptible of various meanings. It
may import absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or it may import that
which is only convenient."
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Showing that the use of a method of investigation is "indispensable"
or "essential" is arguably more difficult than demonstrating that
"there are no other means readily available,"45 because the latter
suggests only that some degree of hardship would result from the use
of other methods. While as a practical matter, the distinction
between the two showings might not be significant, the requirement
seems to have represented a l~gislative judgment that a stronger
showing of n~ed should be made before the more intrusive electronic
devices were used.
The facts required on electronic surveillance applications
likewise made obtaining a surveillance order more difficult than
obtaining a wiretapping order. More specific than the corresponding
provisions in the 1956 Wiretapping Act, the electronic surveillance
statute required that
[t]he affiant shall identify, with reasonable particularity, the
device or devices to be used, the person or persons whose
conversation is to be intercepted, the crime or crimes which
are suspected to have been, or about to be committed, and
that the evidence thus obtained will be used solely in
connection with an investigation or prosecution of the said
crimes before any such ex parte order shall be issued. 46
By contrast, the Wiretapping Act did not require identification of the
persons whose conversation was to be intercepted, only identification of the particular telephone or telegraph line which was to be
tapped. 47 Strangely enough, the Electronic Surveillance Act did not
provide for suppression of evidence obtained in violation of its
provisions. Unlike the Maryland Wiretapping Act, the only statutory
sanction for violation of the electronic surveillance law was the
criminal misdemeanor penalty.
In 1965, section 125D was added to Article 27,48 requiring
persons possessing any electronic eavesdropping or wiretapping
device to register that device with the superintendent of state police,
including with the registration the name, address, identifying
characteristics, and occupation of the possessor, an identifying
description of each device possessed, and any further information
the superintendent required. 49 The provision made. it unlawful for
any person to make any device unless it was registered before or
immediately upon its completion. Registration was also required
before any device could be transferred. 50 The equipment to be
registered was broadly defined as
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 94(a)(3) (1971) (repealed 1977).
[d. art. 27, § 125A(b) (1976) (repealed 1977).
[d. art. 35, § 94 (1971) (repealed and recodified 1973).
Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 201, 1965 Md. Laws 212 (repealed 1977).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125D(a) (1976) (repealed 1977).
[d. § 125D(b).
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every device, instrument, apparatus, or equipment, which is
designed or especially re-designed to be adapted or actually
adapted for the purpose of (1) secretly overhearing or
reporting any part of the conversation or words spoken to or
by any person in private conversation without the knowledge or consent, express or implied, of that person, (2)
intercepting or obtaining or attempting to obtain the whole
or any part of a telephonic or telegraphic communication
without the knowledge and consent of the participants
thereto. 51
The registration provision was not directed to a law enforcement
officer in the duly authorized performance of his duties. 52 Also
exempt from the registration requirement was a telephone or
telegraph employee engaged in company business "while in the
regular course of his employment."53

C. Marylana Law After Title III
Maryland wiretap and electronic surveillance law entered a new
phase upon passage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act in 1968. 54 In State v. Siegel,55 the Maryland Court of
Appeals considered whether the provisions of Title III were
constitutional, and whether they were properly implemented by the
existing provisions of the Maryland Code governing wiretapping
and electronic surveillance. The court concluded that the federal
statute complied with requirements set forth by the Supreme Court
in Katz, Osborn, and Berger,56 noting that:

[T]he federal act is not self-executing as applied to the states.
Under § 2516(2), the principal prosecuting attorney of any
state or political subdivision, if "authorized by a statute of
that State," may apply "to a State court judge of competent
jurisdiction for an order authorizing" the interception of
wire or oral communication . . . . That section also states
that the issuing judge may grant the order "in conformity
with section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable
State statute."57
Not only must the state have enacted its own statute before Title
III can be effectuated, the Siegel court explained, but the state
51. Id.
52.Id.
53. Id. Penalties for violation of § 125D were the same as penalties for violation of
§ 125A·C, that is, a maximum of one year in prison, maximum $500 fine, or both.
Id. § 125D(c).
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
55. 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972).
56. See text accompanying notes 3-9 supra.
57. 266 Md. at 271, 292 A.2d at 94.
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statute cannot be less restrictive than the federal statute. The Siegel
court emphasized the mandate in section 2515 that evidence
obtained by the interception of communications in violation of Title
III cannot be received into evidence in any court, federal or state.
According to the Siegel court, "a state act which is more closely
circumscribed than the federal law in granting eavesdrop authority
is certainly permissible."58
One of the more significant holdings of the Siegel court was that
the federal Act required strict compliance. Title III "sets up a strict
procedure that must be followed and we will not abide any deviation,
no matter how slight, from the prescribed path."59 In Siegel, the
magistrate "deviated" from the Act by not including in his order the
required statements that the interceptions must begin "as soon as
practicable," "shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception
under this chapter," and "must terminate upon attainment of the
authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days."60 In dismissing
the indictment, the court rejected the state's argument that
"substantial compliance" with the Act was sufficient so long as the
court scrutinized the manner in which the wiretap was carried out. 61
However, two years after Siegel was decided, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Giordan0 62 held that evidence derived from
wiretapping must be suppressed under Title III only where there is
"failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly
and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the
use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the
employment of this extraordinary investigative device."63

58. Id. at 272, 292 A.2d at 94 (citing Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 168-69, 151 A.2d
737, 741 (1959}).
59. Id. at 274, 292 A.2d at 95 (emphasis added).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5} (1970).
61. Id.; accord, State v. Lee, 16 Md. App. 296, 295 A.2d 812 (1972). But see Everhart v.
State, 274 Md. 459, 486-87, 337 A.2d 100, 116 (1974) (court held that, in view of
recent Supreme Court decisions, the fact that evidence is tainted no longer gives
defendant right to have indictment dismissed).
62. 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (a Maryland case on appeal).
63. Id. at 527 (emphasis added). The Court based its decision upon 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(1O}(a} (1970), which provided three instances in which the evidence is
inadmissible:
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it intercepted
was insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of
authorization or approval.
The Court lended some credence to the government's argument that paragraph
(i) does not cover statutory as well as constitutional violations. If such were the
intent of Congress, the purely statutory violations of paragraphs (ii) and (iii)
would be unnecessary -since they add nothing to the grounds for suppression
already provided in paragraph (i). However, the Court read the words
"unlawfully intercepted" in paragraph (i) as referring not only to interceptions
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Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has not explicitly
departed from its "strict compliance" standard in Siegel, cases after
Giordano have limited strict compliance to those "precondition[s] to
obtaining intercept authority ... central ... [to the] statutory
scheme."64 In other words, only when the judge or officer fails to
abide by the Act's requirements for the application and court order
will strict compliance be required. 65 Failure strictly to comply with
the law during and after interception will not necessarily render the
evidence obtained inadmissible. For example, in Spease v. State66
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that "[w ]here prejudice is not
shown" or where "actual knowledge of the wiretap is evident,"67
failure to serve the intercepted party with an inventory after
interception precisely as set forth in the Act does not necessitate
suppression of evidence. Emphasizing that the "opinion wasn't
intended as a departure in any way from the holding in Siegel,"68 the
court explained that the "fatal defect" in Siegel had been an
essential "precondition" to obtaining authorization to intercept. 69
During the regular 1973 session,70 an extensive revision of
wiretapping and electronic surveillance laws was enacted by the

64.

65.

66.
67.

68.

69.

70.

made unconstitutionally, but to those made in violation of those requirements
that "directly and substantially implement the congressional intention." 416
U.S. at 527.
See Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 108, 338 A.2d 284, 296 (1975); Calhoun v. State,
34 Md. App. 365, 367 A.2d 40 (1977); Haina v. State, 30 Md. App. 295, 352 A.2d
874 (1975). But see 30 VAND. L. REV. 98 (1977). This casenote examined the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.
1976), which held that despite a state statute disallowing interceptions and the
admission of evidence derived from interceptions without exception, the federal"
courts may allow evidence obtained in violation of the state statute to be
admitted in a federal criminal trial, so long as the evidence is not obtained in
violation of either the fourth amendment or Title III.
See, e.g., Haina v. State, 30 Md. App. 295, 352 A.2d 874 (1976).
275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975).
Id. at 105, 338 A.2d at 294. In Spease, one of the appellants received a copy of a
search warrant with its underlying affidavit 12 days after the. wiretap's
termination. He never received an "inventory," which under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(d)
is to be sent not later than ninety days after termination of the period of an order
or its extensions. The court also ruled that the circuit court did not err in refusing
to suppress intercepted conversations of another appellant despite 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(9) which prohibits use of evidence of intercepted conversations against a
party unless at least ten days prior to trial he has been furnished with a copy of
the application and wiretap order. The appellant had actual notice of the wiretap
almost six months before trial.
Id. at 108 n.3, 338 A.2d at 295 n.3.
The court of special appeals in Poore v. State, reiterated the Spease distinction
between pre-order and post-order compliance standards:
In the former, a defect will void the order and cause suppression of the
evidence, but in the latter, a defect will not vitiate the order if there has
been substantial compliance and no prejudice to the defendant is shown.
Poore v. State, Daily Record, March 21, 1978 at 2, col. 1, 39 Md. App. 44, 53-54,
384 A.2d 103, 110 (1978).
During the state's 1973 Special Session, the Maryland General Assembly enacted
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article which included the substance of
Article 35. ~~ 92-99. Act of August 22. 1973, ch. 2, 1973 Md. Laws Spec. Sess. 4.
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general assembly, but was later vetoed by Governor Mandel.
Explaining his veto in a letter to the Speaker of the House of
Delegates,71 the governor stressed that proposed House Bill 962
repealed by implication the portion of section 93 of Article 35, which
prohibited wiretapping without the consent of all parties to the
conversation. House Bill 962 would have allowed interception
without consent of all parties under three circumstances: 1) by a
person acting "under color of law" where such person was a party to
the conversation; 2) by a person acting "under color of law" where
one of the parties had given prior consent; or 3) by a person not actting "under color of law" under the same restrictions, but with the
additional limitation that such interception not be "for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
constitution, or federal or state law, or for the purpose of committing
any other injurious act."72
The governor expressed his concern that the new law would
allow . .'. anyone . . . to intercept, listen in, and record the
private conversations of people where only one party ...
has given consent . . . . The other party ... is thus subject
to having his conversation intercepted without his knowledge [or] ... prior court approval, and without any need to
show probable cause to believe that criminal activity of any
kind may be afoot. The very opportunity for unwarranted
spying and intrusions on people's privacy authorized by this
bill is frightening; and recent revelations have given clear
indication that the possibilities of abuse are more real than
theoretical. 73
An equally concerned legislature established an investigating
committee in 1975 to examine allegations that state police were
conducting illegal surveillance of citizens. 74 The dual purpose of the
investigation was to uncover any unwarranted informationgathering activities and to make recommendations to the next
session of the general assembly for legislation permanently to
correct the abuses found. 75
71. 1973 Md. Laws 1924.
72. [d.
73. [d. at 1924-25. While House Bill 962 was defeated, the language which the
governor had so vehemently opposed is the language which was adopted by the
1977 Act. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § lo-402(c)(2), (3) (Supp. 1977).
74. A Baltimore City grand jury began an investigation in the fall of 1974 of alleged
police surveillance of citizens not suspected of criminal activity. Although the
grand jury was not able to complete its investigation before the term expired, it
submitted a report on January 10, 1975, recommending that the investigation be
continued by the incoming grand jury. REPORT TO THE SENATE OF MARYLAND BY
THE SENATE INVESTIGATING COMM. ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SENATE
RESOLUTIONS 1 AND 151 OF THE 1975 MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1975)
[hereinafter cited as 1975 SENATE REPORTS].
75. [d.
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One significant area of police surveillance investigated by the
senate committee was wiretapping. Sworn testimony and affidavits
from former police officers revealed that the Baltimore Police
Department from the ,mid-1960's until 1973 used Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Company employees to monitor particular
telephone lines without court order. By virtue of this unauthorized
monitoring, the police were able to obtain a telephone subscriber's
name and address and other information relating to illegal
activities. In tum, this data was used to prepare affidavits for search
warrant applications.
As a result of their study, the committee recommended that a
comprehensive state act be passed, patterned along the lines of Title
III. The committee observed that the "current laws ... regulating
[wiretapping and electronic surveillanceJ are inadequate both in
substance and in form and lack necessary specificity in such critical
areas as wiretapping. These laws are located in various sections
throughout" the Maryland Code and many are all but obsolete in
view of Maryland case law construing them and federal enactments."76
III. THE 1977 MARYLAND WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ACT
A. Pre-Interception Provisions

In enacting Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, the general assembly adopted substantially all of the
language in Title III. One major difference between the two acts is
the definition of the type of communication which would require a
judicial order before interception. The federal statute defines "oral
communication" as "any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation."77 By
contrast, the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act
defines "oral communication" as "any conversation or words spoken
to or by any person in private conversation."78
The "justifiable expectation of privacy" reasoning adopted by
the federal law originated in Katz v. United States. 79 According to
76. [d. at 67, The Senate Report made several specific recommendations for reform
which will be noted when the relevant provisions are discussed,
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1970). See generally Note, The Reasonable Expectation, of
Privacy - Katz v. United States, A Postscription, IND. L. REv. 468 (1976).
78. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-401(2) (Supp. 1977). This definition is
derived from the former Article 27, § 125A provision which made it "unlawful for
any person , . , to overhear or record any part of the conversation or words
spoken to or by any person in private conversation without the knowledge or
consent, express or implied, of that other person." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A
(1976) (repealed 1977) (emphasis added).
79. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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the Katz court, when a person closes the doors of a telephone booth,
he may justifiably rely upon the privacy of his conversation. so In
Hoffa v. United States,8! the Court stated that such reliance is not
justified where a "wrongdoer" mistakenly believes "that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it,"82
nor can the defendant justifiably expect privacy upon confiding to a
government agent who records the conversation electronically
without the defendant's knowledge. 83
The refusal of the Maryland legislature to incorporate the
federal definition of "oral communication" into the Maryland Act
may indicate either an intent to impose stricter standards or to
clarify the existing federal provision. In United States v. Curreri,84
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
commented that a state wiretapping and electronic surveillance law
may be stricter than Title III, but may not fall below minimum
federal standards. 85
While the 1977 Maryland Act has adopted the federal consensual/participant monitoring allowed in Hoffa and Lopez, it has
somewhat restricted the scope of participant monitoring. 86 Before the
new wiretapping and electronic surveillance law, the state status of
participant monitoring was uncertain. The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals in Pennington v. State 87 remarked that the
Maryland wiretapping statute "does not prohibit participant
monitoring,"88 but reserved the question of whether the state's
electronic surveillance statute similarly allowed such monitoring.
Despite this prIor disparity in treatment of participant monitoring between Maryland's wiretapping and electronic surveillance
laws, the legislature has now left no doubt that a person's
conversation may be intercepted under certain conditions without a
court order and without his permission. 89 Section 10-402(c)(2) of the
1977 Act allows "an investigative or law enforcement officer ... to
intercept a wire or oral communication in order to provide evidence
of the commission of [certain enumerated offenses] where the person
is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to the interception."90
Section 2511(2)(c), the comparable provision in the federal
wiretap statute, states that "it shall not be unlawful ... for a person
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

[d. at 352.
375 U.S. 293 (1966).
[d. at 302.
See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963).
358 F. Supp. 607 (D. Md. 1974).
[d. at 613.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(2) (Supp. 1977).
19 Md. App. 253, 310 A.2d 817 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974).
[d. at 277 n.13, 310 A.2d at 830 n.13.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402 (Supp. 1977).
[d. § 10-402(c)(2) (emphasis added) ..
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acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication,
where such person is a party to the communication or one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception."91 Rather than using the possibly ambiguous terminology "person acting under color of law," the new Maryland statute
clearly delineates those persons who may intercept under such
circumstances, limiting the scope of such interceptions to the
enumerated felonies in section 10-402(c)(2).
Under the Maryland Act, only "an investigative or law
enforcement officer" may intercept a conversation upon the consent
of only one party.92 Under the federal statute, anyone may intercept
a conversation, provided:
(1) the "person is a party to the communication [;] or
[(2)] one of the parties ... has given prior consent to
such interception."93
The interception may not be for the purpose of committing tortious
or criminal acts, however. In Maryland, such an interception may be
undertaken by a person who is not a law enforcement officer only if:
(1) the "person is a party to the communication and [;]
[(2)]

all of the parties ... have given prior consent."94

By making both participation and consent mandatory, the Maryland law has imposed stricter requirements for civilian monitoring
than has Title III.
Monitoring is further restricted in Maryland "to provide
evidence of the commission of the offenses of murder, kidnapping,
gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in controlled
dangerous substances, or any conspiracy to commit any of these
offenses."95 The federal Act's list of crimes for which surveillance

91.
92.
93.
94.

18 U.S.C. § 251l(2)(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(2) (Supp. 1977).
18 U.S.C. § 251l(2)(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(3) (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
Maryland has also incorporated the federal stipulation that the interception not
be to further a criminal or tortious act. [d.
95. MD. CT. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-406 (Supp. 1977). House Bill 475, enacted
during the 1978 Legislative Session, adds arson to the list of crimes which may
be grounds for interception within the state. House Bill 475 was signed into law
on May 2,1978. Law of May 2,1978, ch. 339,1978 Md. Laws __ Another bill
was introduced which would have included larceny and receiving stolen goods
among the Act's enumerated offenses. H.B. 701 (1978) (filed Jan. 13, 1978,
unfavorably reported March 15, 1978).
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can be conducted is considerably broader.96 While Maryland
rightfully could have added to its enumerated offenses any crime
"dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable . . . for more
than one year,"97 the general assembly narrowed the list of
interceptable offenses.
Less discretion is allowed under Maryland law than under Title
III in the performance of certain procedures by the issuing judge. For
example, where the federal Act states that a court order "may"
require periodic progress reports to be made to the judge,98 the
Maryland Act states that all interception orders "shall" require
progress reports. 99 Similarly, section 1D-408(g)(4) mandates that the
judge make available to the persons named in the order loo portions of
the intercepted communications, applications, and orders pertaining
to that person and the alleged crime. IOl On the other hand, Title III
leaves to the judge's discretion whether in the "interest of justice"
inspection of the intercepted communications and other materials is
needed. 102
In Maryland, only a "judge of competent jurisdiction"lo3·can
authorize an interception under specified conditions. The new
Maryland statute defines a "judge of competent jurisdiction" as a
"circuit court [judge] or [a judge of] the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City."!04 Section 10-403 of the previous Maryland wiretapping law,
however, included district court judges among those authorized to
issue orders.105 The district court judges are omitted from the new
law, since interceptions may be authorized only in cases where they
will reveal evidence of particular felonies that lie outside district
court jurisdiction. lo6 The previous Maryland statute addressed itself
to "crimes" rather than to specific, enumerated felonies. 107

96. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c) (1970) (e.g., bankruptcy fraud and obstruction of criminal
investigation are included).
97. Id. § 2518(d) (1970). See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.460 (1973).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1970).
99. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(f) (Supp. 1977).
100. Other parties to intercepted communications may also be included within the
judge's discretion. Id. at § 10-408(g)(4).
101. Id.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
103. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-406 (Supp. 1977).
104. Id. § 10-401(8).
105. Id. § 10-403(a) (1974) (repealed 1977). See Adkings, Code Revision in Maryland:
The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 34 MD. L. REV. 7 (1974) (notes that
former Article 26, § 145(b)(6) was written into § 10-403, despite apparent conflict
with federal law which, according to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9)(b), allowed authorization
only by judges of courts of "general criminal jurisdiction of a State").
106. The district court presently has criminal jurisdiction in the case of misdemeanors
and certain other crimes: false pretenses, larceny, larceny after trust, receiving
stolen goods, and shoplifting, which may be felonies or misdemeanors. MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. ~ 4-301 (1974).
107. See id. § 10-403(a)(I)-(2) (1974) (repealed 1977).
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B. Treatment of Violations Under the 1977 Maryland Act

The Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act
provides maximum criminal penalties of five years imprisonment or
a fine of $10,000 or both for the person who "manufactures,
assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic, mechanical or other
device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of the
device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious
interception of wire or oral communications."108 Under the federal
Act, manufacture or sale is a felony only if the person had reason to
know that such a device or its components has circulated or is about
to circulate through the mail or in interstate or foreign commerce.1 09
The practical effect of the changed Maryland law, however, may be
relatively insignificant. It is doubtful that violations under the Act
will involve devices completely unconnected with interstate commerce, especially considering the numerous components which
comprise most wiretapping devices' and the likelihood that at least
one of those components has been manufactured outside the state.
Thus, a violator of the federal Act would generally violate the
Maryland Act as well. The new section 10-403 merely increases the
chances of prosecution for these violations by providing a state
forum in addition to the forum already existing in the federal courts.
A more significant difference between the two acts can be found
in Maryland's omission of the federal prohibition against advertising for wiretapping/bugging devices. It would seem incongruous to
impose a $10,000 fine for the sale of such devices, yet freely to allow
advertisement of devices within the state by the very persons
prohibited from selling them. One logical explanation for the
Maryland omission is that it was purely an oversight on the part of
the legislature. lIo
Both the Maryland and federal Acts create an exception to the
manufacturing prohibition for an officer, agent, or employee of
federal, state, or local government who manufactures, assembles,
possesses, or sells devices in the normal course of his lawful
activities. IlI Maryland's section 10-403(b)(3) and (4), however,
contains the additional qualification that "any sale made under the
authority of [these] paragraph[s] may only be for the purpose of
disposing of obsolete or surplus devices."1l2 Officers, agents, or
108. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-403(a) (Supp. 1977). The change was
recommended by the Senate Investigating Committee. 1975 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 74, at 68.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (1970).
110. Among those jurisdictions prohibiting the sale and manufacture of devices, none
has seen fit to remove the advertising prohibition. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-9-309 (1973); D.C. CODE § 23-543 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 934.04 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. ~ 626A.03 (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §570-A:3 (1974); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §2A:156A-5 (1971).
111. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2512(2)(b) (1970) with MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 10-403(b)(3), (4) (Supp. 1977).
112. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-403(b)(3) (Supp. 1977).
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employees of a Maryland law enforcement agency or political
subdivision of Maryland are limited further to manufacturing,
assembling, possessing, or selling such devices only if "the
particular officer, agent, or employee is specifically authorized by the
chief administrator of the employer law enforcement agency" to
further "a particular law enforcement purpose."1l3
Under section 10-411 of the Maryland Act, law enforcement
agencies are now required to register all interception devices in their
control with the Maryland Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services within ten days of obtaining control or
possession of the devices. 1l4 While the registration requirement has
been in existence since 1965, the previous Maryland law imposed no
time limit in which the devices were to be registered.ll5 Apparently,
Maryland is the only jurisdiction to incorporate a registration
provision in its electronic surveillance law. 1l6
Maryland's new penalty provision 117 is not quite so unique to the
state. Borrowed from the corresponding provision in Title III,118
section 10-402(b) makes interception or disclosure of communications obtained in violation of the Act punishable by a possible
$10,000 fine and five-year imprisonment, or both.1l9 Before the recent
Act, violation of Maryland's wiretapping law was only a misdemeanor with a maximum $1,000 fine or 90-day imprisonment or both. 120
Making violation of the new law a felony also extends the limitation
period in which the state may prosecute beyond the one-year limit
set for all misdemeanors.l21 The change represents a legislative
judgment that the protection of individual privacy is worth
reinforcing with stringent penalties.
Section 10-410 of the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Act further expands the protection afforded private
parties. Until the 1977 enactment, Maryland provided the subject of
an interception conducted in contravention of Maryland law no civil
remedy for the invasion of his privacy. Like the federal Act,
Maryland law now grants the injured party the right to sue "any
person who intercepts, discloses; or uses, or procures any other
113. Id. § 10-403(b)(4) (emphasis added).
114. Id. § 10-411. The SenatEl Investigating Committee recommended that devices
should be registered within ten days of their receipt. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 74 at 70.
115. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125D (1976) (repealed 1977).
116. As of February, 1978, no other jurisdiction had enacted a similar registration
requirement.
117. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(b) (Supp. 1977).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(I)(d) (1970).
119. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(b) (Supp. 1977).
120. Id. § 10-408 (1974) (repealed 1977). Penalties for violation of the Maryland
electronic surveillance statute were a maximum fine of $500 or imprisonment of
up to one year, or both in the court's discretion. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125B
(1976) (repealed 1977).
121. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-106(a) (1974).
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person to intercept, disclose, or use the communications" obtained in
violation of the subsection. 122 The plaintiff in such an action may
recover actual damages "computed at the rate of $100 a day for each
day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher,"123 in addition to
punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees and "other litigation
costs reasonably incurred."124
Litigants who might have been discouraged from bringing suit
in federal court by the inconvenience of travelling to Baltimore from
distant parts of the state may now sue in their local circuit courts
under the new Maryland law. Others who would not have had
standing to sue in federal court for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional "amount in controversy"125 are provided a forum in which to
allege wiretapping or electronic surveillance violations. 126
When the subject of surveillance conducted in violation of the
Act is charged with a crime based on the evidence seized, the
Maryland Act differs from Title III in the permissible grounds for
suppression of that evidence. Under the federal Act, evidence may be
suppressed if "the order of authorization or approval under which it
was intercepted is insufficient on its face."127 The Maryland Act
adds the words "or was not obtained or issued in strict compliance
with this subtitle,"128 reflecting the Spease holding that suppression
is proper only where "preconditions" to wiretapping are violated. 129
The Maryland Act would appear to lay down more exacting
procedural requirements than Title III. As interpreted by federal
case law,130 however, Title III demands the same strict compliance to
surveillance "preconditions" that is expressed by the Maryland law.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. § 10-41O(a) (Supp. 1977).
Id. § 10-41O(a)(1).
Id. § 10-41O(a)(2), (3).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) (requiring $10,000 damages to be alleged).
It should be noted, however, that the 1976 amendment to § 1331 removed the
jurisdictional amount in suits brought against the United States, one of its
employees, or an officer or an employee acting within the scope of his office.
Since most, if not all, civil suits would be brought against "law enforcement
officers," the benefit of having a state forum is somewhat lessened. Under
Maryland law, as in the federal statute at 18 U.S.C. § 2520, a "good faith reliance
on a court order" shall constitute a complete 'defense to any civil or criminal
action brought. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-41O(3)(b) (Supp. 1977).
Under the federal statute, reliance upon § 2518(7) is also a defense. That section
allows interceptions to be made without prior judicial authorization when
grounds exist for an order with regard to conspiratorial actions of organized
crime or threats to the national security when an interception must be made
before an order may be obtained. Maryland has not adopted enabling legislation
for such interceptions, although § 2518(7) allows the interceptions to be made by
"the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting
pursuant to a statute of that State." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1O)(a)(ii) (1970).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(h)(i)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1977).
See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.s. 562 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416
U.S. 505 (1974).
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One final variation between the two acts is the addition of a
state prohibition against breaking, entering, or trespassing with
intent to plant or remove electronic surveillance devices. 131 Such
actions would not necessarily be crimes under Maryland's existing
trespass or breaking and entering laws.l 32

C. Possible Problem Areas in the Act
Despite the numerous advantages of the Maryland Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance Act, the law poses some distinct
interpretational problems, particularly where it has departed from
the language of Title III. Nowhere is this problem more evident than
in the substitution of "private conversation" for "justifiable
expectation" to describe what oral communications may not be
intercepted without court order.133 Maryland is one of only two states
to have incorporated this definition of oral communication into its
wiretapping and electronic surveillance law. 134 State precedent
interpreting the meaning of "private conversation" within the
context of Maryland's prior wiretapping law is scanty.135 Decisions
from other jurisdictions are likewise meager.
Before 1973, Washington had made no attempt to clarify the
meaning of "private conversation" in its wiretapping and electronic
surveillance law. Stating that the words should be construed "to best
fulfill the purpose of the statute,"136 a Washington court noted that
"the phrase 'private conversation' is all embracing . . . . To construe
the words 'private conversation' narrowly and grudgingly would
unnecessarily fail to give full effect to the legislative purpose to
protect the freedom of people to hold conversations intended only for

131. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-412 (Supp. 1977).
132. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 30,32,576-5778 (1976). To be an illegal trespass
under Article 27, §§ 576-5778, the property owner must have either posted his
property, notified the trespasser not to enter the property, or the trespasser must
have refused to leave a public building or certain other public property. Even if a
violation of §§ 576-5778 were found, the maximum fine of $1,000 for the trespass
fails to approach the $10,000 figure imposed by the Maryland wiretapping and
electronic surveillance law.
Since violation of the wiretapping and electronic surveillance ll:!.w is now a
felony, the violator may also be guilty of violating Article 27, § 30 or § 32, which
penalizes those who break into dwellings at night with the intent to commit a
felony. While .neither § 30 nor § 32 of Article 27 carries fines for breaking and
entering offenses, the possible prison sentence for their violation is ten years in
the state penitentiary.
133. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-401(2) (Supp. 1977).
134. The Washington statute also makes it unlawful to "intercept, record, or divulge
any ... [p]rivate conversation." See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9.73.030 (1977).
135. The court in Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972), however, used
the justifiable expectation test to determine if it was a violation of the fourth
amendment to film a criminal act in progress. The court failed to state whether
the same test would similarly apply to "private conversations" within the
Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act.
136. State v. Grant, 9 Wash. App. 260, 265, 511 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1973).
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the ears of the participant."137 While the Washington interpretation
of "private conversation" is persuasive authority in the Maryland
courts, it should be noted that Washington, unlike Maryland, still
requires the consent of all parties to a conversation before
interception will be allowed.138 The recent removal of the all-party
consent requirement for police-conducted surveillance from the
Maryland law casts some doubt on whether the Maryland courts will
be able to attribute to the phrase "private conversation" the same
broad construction given it by Washington's state courts.
How Maryland courts will interpret the legislature's decision to
eliminate from the Act prior prohibitions against the advertising of
electronic devices is equally doubtful. 139 While clearly a less
egregious offense than manufacturing, distributing, or selling
devices, allowing advertising does not serve to encourage the Act's
purpose of limiting the number and type of persons to whom devices
will be made available.
Another minor difference between the Maryland and federal Acts
has the potential for causing some confusion. Under Title III, the
"Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially
designated ... may authorize an application to a Federal judge of
competent jurisdiction."14o The corresponding provision in the
Maryland statute states that the "Attorney General or any State's
Attorney may apply to a judge of competent jurisdiction"141 for a
court order. The Maryland law then requires that each application
include "[t]he identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer
making the application, and the officer authorizing the application."142 On the strength of section 1O-408(a)(1), a "law enforcement
officer" may apply directly to a judge for a court order, even though
the earlier provision in the act allowed only the attorney general or

137. Id. The Grant court held that conversations between the defendant und his
attorney and between the defendant and a police detective were "private
conversations" within the meaning of the Washington Act, where conducted at
the police station without knowledge of interception and without consent of both
parties. See also State v. Smith, 85 Wash. 2d 840, 540 P.2d 424 (1975), where the
court held that a tape recording made by a murder victim which recorded
screams, shouts, and gun shots did not fall within the definition of "private
conversation."
138. Compare MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c) (Supp. 1977) with WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (1977). In Maryland, the consent of all parties is
needed only when interception is not under the direction of a law enforcement
officer.
139. The 1974 ABA Standards Report on Electronic Surveillance recommended that
advertising be prohibited in Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
Act. THE JOINT COMMITTEES OF MARYLAND JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AND
MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, To IMPLEMENT THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 585C(b) (1974) [hereinafter
cited as ABA STANDARDS REPORT).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
141. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-406 (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
142. Id. § 1O-408(a)(I) (emphasis added).
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the state's attorney to make such an application. 143 The apparent
inconsistency between the two provisions should be resolved for the
purpose of clarity.
IV. PROVISIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THE MARYLAND ACT
In its 1974 Report on ABA Standards on Electronic Surveillance,144 joint committees of the Maryland Judicial Conference and
the Maryland Bar Association made a series of recommendations for
changes to the Maryland wiretapping and electronic surveillance
law. Among the joint committee suggestions not adopted by the
Maryland legislature145 is one particularly worthy of note.
In recognition of the sensitive and legally privileged nature of
certain communications, the committee proposed that the interception of communications in places "primarily used" by practicing,
licensed physicians, attorneys, and clergymen be prohibited unless
"special need" is shown.14s Some jurisdictions have already enacted
electronic surveillance laws which incorporate similar protective
language.147 In the interest of minimizing unnecessary interception,
other jurisdictions have imposed a "special need" requirement
whenever the law enforcement officer anticipates that public
facilities will be tapped. 148
143. As a practical matter, "officer" will likely be interpreted to mean attorney
general or state's attorney rather than "law enforcement officer." Ct. United
States v. Giordano .. 416 U.S. 505, 520 (1974) ("The authority to apply for court
orders is to be narrowly confined ... to those responsive to the political
process."). Accord, Poore v. State, Daily Record, March 21, 1978, at 1, col. 1,39
Md. App. 44, 384 A.2d 103 (1978).
144. ABA STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 140.
145. The Maryland legislature did not adopt the following major recommendations
made in the ABA Standards Report:
(1) To follow the federal definition of "oral communications";
(2) To include in the definition of "investigative or law enforcement officer"
United States as well as state officials;
(3) To disallow interception where not all parties consent, even where acting
under police direction;
(4) To prohibit advertising of electronic devices in any newspaper, magazine,
handbill or other publication;
(5) To add to the crimes for which wiretapping could be conducted (a) arson (b)
maliciously burning certain property, (c) attempting to bum certain
property, (d) breaking and entering with intent to steal, (e) rape, (1)
carnal knowledge of a child under 14 years of age or an insane or
incompetent woman. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§6-1O, 29,30,32,461,
462 (1976 and Supp. 1977);
(6) To allow the applicant for a court order to base his application on
"information and belief," supported by affidavits of law enforcement
officers oiothers having knowledge of the facts;
(7) To add grounds for suppression where "the order was based on an affidavit
or material known by the applicant to be materially false."
146. ABA STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 140, § 585H(5).
147. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41h (West Cum. Supp. 1978); R.1. GEN. LAws
§ 12-5.1 (Supp. 1977).
148. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §54-41d(7) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. REV.
STAT. §2A:156A-ll (Cum. Supp. 1977); R.1. GEN. LAws §12-5.1, 1-4(b) (Supp.
1977).

1978]

Wiretapping

395

While there now exists a provision in Maryland against
admission of evidence derived from the interception of a privileged
communication,149 it would be a greater safeguard to prevent
privileged communications from being intercepted unless absolutely
necessary.l50 However, the use of the vague language "special need"
does not clarify for either law enforcement officers or the judiciary
exactly what must be shown in addition to the Act's already strong
requirements.
Section 10-403 now mandates that the application include "[a]
full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."151 It is
difficult to conceive of a stronger showing of need that could be
made by a law enforcement officer, with the exception of showing
that he has actually tried all other available procedures before
requesting a wiretap or bug.l 52 Yet, without resorting to the use of
"special need," a provision could be fashioned which would further
protect privileged communications from unwarranted ihterception.
The provision could require that the applicant demonstrate a belief
that the attorney, physician or clergyman whose telephones, office
or home are to be tapped or bugged is, himself, suspected of one of
the Act's enumerated offenses. In the case of the attorney, an
interception could also be allowed upon showing that there is reason
to believe the attorney is concealing information on the proposed
criminal acts of a client, in direct violation of the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility.153
In seeking conformity with Title III, the Maryland General
Assembly may have failed to consider seriously provisions in other
jurisdictions' wiretapping and electronic surveillance laws which
either supplement or clarify language in the federal Act. Many of
these provisions might be beneficial additions to the Maryland
149. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE Arm. § 1D-407(d) (Supp. 1977). Section 1D-407(d)
provides that "[a]n otherwise privileged wire or oral communication intercepted
in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this subtitle, does not lose
its privileged character."
150. A privileged conversation may now be excJuded from interception where the
monitor conducts "spot checking" of the conversation being recorded. In reality,
" 'most agents have been reluctant to unplug their earphones for fear that they
will miss an important conversation.' " Poore v. State, Daily Record, March 21,
1978, at 2 col. 5, 39 Md. App. 44, 70, 384 A.2d 103, 118 (1978) (quoting Low, PostAuthorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps: Minimization, Amendment,
Sealing, and Inventories, 61 CORN. L. REV. 92, 96 (1975». Consequently, limiting
inteceptions of communications conducted on attorney's, physican's and
clergymen's phones may be the only means for truly minimizing intrusions into
privileged conversations.
151. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1D-408(a)(3) (Supp. 1977).
152. See Trovinger v. State, 34 Md. App. 357, 361, 367 A.2d 548, 551 (1977), where the
court held that "[tJhe state need not exhaust all conceivable investigative
possibilities before seeking a wiretap."
153. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, D.R. 7-102(A)(3) (1976).
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statute. For example, Connecticut requires that the application for a
court order state that the person who will be conducting the wiretap
or electronic surveillance be qualified to do so by training and
experience. 154 Such a provision serves to implement the Act's policy
that wiretaps should be conducted carefully so as to reduce the
chance that unnecessary or excessive intrusions into privacy will
occur.155 Also minimizing unnecessary intrusions are the Connecticut and Massachusetts provisions which require the applicant to
demonstrate that secret entry to install a device is necessary, if such
installation is to be made. 156
A few jurisdictions that substantially have adopted Title III
impose upon telephone and telegraph companies the duty to report to
the police department or state's attorney any violations of the
surveillance law of which they may be aware. 157 While Maryland
imposes no equivalent reporting duty, the state does require
"communication common carrier[s], landlord[s] ... or other person[s]" to furnish law enforcement officers with "all information,
facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the
interception unobtrusively."158 To require the reporting of unauthorized tapping by those facilities most likely to discover such
interceptions would be in keeping with the statute's expressed intent
to encourage cooperation of third parties in the effective enforcement
of the Maryland law.
According to some states, wiretapping laws should not be so
stringently enforced where the need to make routine recordings of
conversations for purely legitimate purposes would make obtaining
a court order unduly burdensome. 159 Massachusetts carves out an
exception to the requirement for a court order in addition to those
already created under Title III of the federal statute. I60 When an
"intercommunication system" is used in the "ordinary course of ...
business," Massachusetts does not make it unlawful for that
business to intercept intercommunications without the supervision
of a law enforcement officer. 161 The major difficulty with this
154. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41d(8) (Supp. 1978).
155. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(e) (1977), which provides
that "[e]very order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the
authorization to intercept ... shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize
the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception." See
generally Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
156. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §54-41c(10) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West Supp. 1974) (must be "reasonably" necessary).
157. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §626A.15 (Cum. Supp. 1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §13-105
(Supp. 1977), § 13-3009 (Special Pamphlet 1977, effective Oct. 1, 1978).
158. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-408(d)(2) (Supp. 1977).
159. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §99 (Supp. 1974).
160. [d. Title III exempts switchboard operators and telephone and telegraph
employees citing in the "normal course" of their employment, as well as law
enforcement officers and those persons acting under their direction in conducting
participant monitoring. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970).
161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1974).
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exception is interpreting the precise meaning of "intercommunication system." Without substantially narrowing the type of equipment falling within th~ definition of "intercommunication system,"
the exception could be abused easily. Less likely to be abused is the
Florida provision that makes the tapping of telephones to trace
obscene, harassing, or threatening telephone calls an exception to
the court order requirement. 162 In Colorado, an exception is provided
for news agencies and their employees where "reasonable notice of
use"163 is given to the public.
One of the more controversial provisions to be drafted into a
state surveillance law is the Virginia requirement that the judge who
considers the application for an order disqualify himself from trying
the case based on evidence obtained in the interception. 164 The
controversiality of the provision may explain why Virginia is thus
far the only state to have mandated judicial disqualification. 165 Not
only does such a provision question the independence and fairness of
the judiciary, but it can pose some practical problems as well. In
those Maryland circuits where judges are separated by as much as
twenty or thirty miles from one another, disqualification can result
in geographical inconvenience and administrative delay.
The American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct does
not expressly forbid a judge from trying a case based on his earlier
ex parte orders.166 Nevertheless, the Code states that
a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including
but not limited to instances where . . . he has. . . personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding .167
162. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976). It should be noted, however, that
this exception may already be covered under the provision making it lawful for a
"communication common carrier" who "in the normal course of ... employment" intercepts oral communications "while engaged in any activity which is a
necessary incident to the rendition of ... service." See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § lo-402(c)(1)(i) (Supp. 1977). Because it is unclear whether tracing
such calls is "incident to the rendition of service," the Maryland legislature
. might be advised to expressly provide for such interceptions by telephone
companies.
163. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-305(1) (1973) states, in part, that "nothing ...
shall ... prevent a news agency, or an employee thereof, from using the
accepted tools and equipment of that news medium in the course of reporting or
investigating a public and newsworthy event."
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-68(b) (Supp. 1977). The Virginia law provides: "The judge
who considers an application for an interception under this chapter, whether
issuing or denying the order, shall be disqualified from presiding at any trial
resulting from or in any manner connected with such interception, regardless of
whether the evidence acquired thereby is used in such trial. HId. (emphasis
added).
165. As of February, 1978.
166. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1975).
167. Id. Canon 3C.(1) and 3C.(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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The Code also strongly cautions against consideration by the judge
of ex parte communications concerning impending proceedings,
"except as authorized by law."168 Naturally, the ex parte nature of a
surveillance order can work to the detriment of the absent party, the
potential criminal defendant. To counteract this detrimental effect,
the issuing judge should evaluate carefully the application to
determine the existence of probable cause. Careful scrutiny, however,
may not be sufficient to adequately safeguard the interests of the
party whose conversations are to be intercepted. Should the same
judge later be called upon to reexamine the propriety of his order and
the probable cause determination upon which it was based, his
impartiality and ability to invalidate the order "might reasonably be
questioned."169 No doubt, a concern with maintaining high standards of judicial ethics and with counteracting the potential adverse
effects of the ex parte order were partly responsible for the Virginia
legislature's enactment of a judicial disqualification provision.

v.

CONCLUSION

The Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act is a
marked improvement over the earlier Maryland statutes in several
notable respects. Not only does the Act increase the punishment for
violation of its provisions, it provides a previously unavailable civil
damage remedy. The. Act further allows for suppression of evidence
seized in violation of the statute, a procedure which did not exist
under the former Electronic Surveillance Act. Unlike the prior law,
the Act penalizes the breaking and entering of premises to plant a
wiretapping or electronic surveillance device, and creates a ten-day
period in which all devices must be registered. Undoubtedly, the
most significant and controversial change from earlier Maryland
law is the provision which now permits wiretapping and electronic
surveillance without the unanimous consent of all the participants to
the communication.
While the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
Act closely follows Title III, it imposes certain procedural requirements which are stricter than the corresponding requirements in the
federal Act. The definition of "oral communications" for which
court-ordered interception is required has conceivably been broadened by a departure from the objective federal "justifiable expectation" test. In espousing the participant monitoring permitted by
federal law, Maryland has limited the types of offenses for which
such monitoring is allowed. When an interception is not conducted
by a law enforcement official, the Act requires that the person
intercepting the communications be a party to that communication
and that the other parties consent to the interception. Title III allows
168. ld. Canon 3A.(4).
169. ld. Canon 3C.(I)(a).
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civilian monitoring when there is either unanimous consent or
participation by the intercepting party.
The judge authorizing a Maryland surveillance must demand
periodic progress reports during the interception and must provide
the subject of surveillance with "portions of the intercepted
communication" upon request after completion of the interception. It
is solely within the discretion of the federal judge whether either of
these actions are to be performed.
Facially stricter than the federal statute, the Maryland Act
provides essentially the same grounds for suppression of evidence as
Title III. Less strict than the federal provision is Maryland's failure
to prohibit the advertising of electronic devices.
Improvement though it may be, the Maryland Act contains
several provisions which call for clarification by the legislature and
lacks other provisions which could demonstrably add to the force
and purpose of the Act. Where intrusion into constitutionally
protected rights is made permissible by statute, that statute should
periodically be re-examined to determine its continuing validity and
effecti veness.

Marianne B. Davis
Laurie R. Bortz

1978]

Wiretapping

401

APPENDIX
Section 10-409(c) of Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Act requires a report to be submitted by the state court
administrator to the general assembly each February concerning
"the number of applications for orders authorizing or approving the
interception of wire or oral communications and the number of
orders and extensions granted or denied during the preceding
calendar year."! The 1978 report made pursuant to section lo-409(c)
reflects wiretapping and electronic surveillance activities conducted
over the six-month period from July through December, 1977,2 as
reported by ten of the state's twenty-four political subdivisions. 3
As summarized in the report, four of the ten subdivisions
indicated no activity,4 whereas Prince George's County, Baltimore
City, Harford County and Montgomery County, in that order,
reported the most activity. None of the twenty-seven court orders
applied for was refused. The most common interception was
conducted by the telephone wiretap (96.3 percent) of a single-family
dwelling (51.9 percent), for either gambling (85.2 percent) or
narcotics (11.1 percent) offenses, for a period of thirty days and at an
average cost of $5,020. While 44.53 percent of the total interceptions
were found to be incriminating, roughly 4.2 percent of all persons
whose conversations were recorded were found guilty of the
offense(s) charged. 5
The following charts were included among the data provided to
the genetal assembly in the 1978 report.

1. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § ID-409(c) (Supp. 1977).
2. A full calendar year could not be reported because of the July, 1977 effective date
of the Act.
3. Among those not reporting was Maryland's Office of the Attorney General. The
Attorney General's Office conducted one wiretap under the order of the Baltimore
Supreme Bench during the period from July 1 through December 31, 1977. A
business phone was tapped for 23 days at a cost of $750 for the specified offenses
of bribery and extortion. At the conclusion of grand jury proceedings, the
Attorney General's Office anticipates that two persons will be arrested as the
result of the wiretapping conducted. See OFFICE OF THE ATT'y GENERAL, REPORT
OF APPLICATION &IOR ORDER AUTHORIZING INTERCEPTION AND POLICE &
COURT ACTION RESULTING FROM INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATION (Feb. 14, 1978).
4. Carroll, Charles, Somerset and Talbot Counties.
5. The report notes, however, that some of the 111 persons arrested are still
awaiting trial.
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WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
PURSUANT TO § lo-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31,1977
REPORTS BY JUDGES

Offense

Type
of
Intercept'

Attorney
Attorney
Attorney
Attorney
Attorney
Attorney
Attorney
Attorney

Gambling Conspiracy
Gambling Conspiracy
Gambling Conspiracy
Gambling Conspiracy
Gambling Conspiracy
Gambling Conspiracy
Gambling Conspiracy
Narcotics

PW
PW
PW
PW
PW
PW
PW
PW

BALTIMORE COUNTY
(Circuit Court)
State's Attorney
1

Gambling Conspiracy

ME

Reporting
Number·
BALTIMORE CITY
(Criminal Court)
1
2
3
4
5

6
7

8

Official Authorizing
Application

State's
State's
State's
State's
State's
State's
State's
State's

CARROLL COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY
CHARLES COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY
HARFORD COUNTY
(Circuit Court)
1

State's
State's
State's
3
State's
4
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
(Circuit Court)
State's
1
State's
2
State's
3
State's
4
2

Attorney
Attorney
Attorney
Attorney

Gambling
Gambling
Gambling
Gambling

PW
PW
PW
PW

Attorney
Attorney
Attorney
Attorney

Gambling
Gambling
Gambling
Gambling

PW
PW
PW
PW

Gambling
Gambling
Gambling
Gambling
Gambling
Gambling
Gambling
Narcotics Conspiracy
Narcotics Conspiracy

PW
PW
PW
PW
PW
PW
PW
PW
PW

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
(Circuit Court)
State's Attorney
1
State's Attorney
2
State's Attorney
3
State's Attorney
4
State's Attorney
5
State's Attorney
6
State's Attorney
7
State's Attorney
8
State's Attorney
9

SOMERSET COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY
TALBOT COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY
WICOMICO COUNTY
(District Court)
1
State's Attorney
Murder Conspiracy
• Corresponds to same number on reports by prosecuting officers.
, TYPE: PW = Phone wire; ME = Microphone-eavesdrop.
2 LOCATION: S =Single family dwelling; A =Apartment; B =Business location; PP
Not reported.

PW

=Pay phone; NR =
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WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
PURSUANT TO § IO-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE
JULY - DECEMBER 31, 1977
REPORTS BY JUDGES
AUTHORIZED LENGTH
Original

Location 2

Date of
Application

Order
(Days)

B
B
S
S
S
S
S
S

09/29/77

30

10110177

30

10/25177
1012:1177
1012:1177
11102177
11/04177
11/29177

30
30

B

Number of
Extensions

Total
Length
(Days)

30
30
30
30
30

30

30

30
1
30

11/17177

30

30

B
S
S
B

11/15/77
12/08177
12/14177
12/14177

60

60

30
30

30
30
30

S
S
A
A

07/19177
08106177
08/06177
10/13177

20
20
20
16

20
20
20
16

pp
pp
pp

23

S
S
A
S
A
S

08/10177
08116177
08/18/77
09/06177
09/01177
09/14/77
09/23177
0912:1177
11126177

30
20
20
20
21
21

NR

10/23177

30

30

1

30

20
23

NOT EXECUTED
NOT EXECUTED
NO INFORMATION FILED

3

30
20
20
20
40
21

30
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WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
PURSUANT TO § lo-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1977
REPORTS BY PROSECUTING OFFICERS

Reporting·
Number

NUMBER OF

Average
Number of
Intercepts
per Day

Number of
Days
in

Operation

Conversations
of Individuals
Intercepted

Intercepts

Incrim·
inating
Intercepts

BALTIMORE CITY
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

24
20
18
15
15
4
1
NO REPORT FILED

BALTIMORE COUNTY
19

8
15
21
7
14
19
35

5hrs.

10
15
24
8
9
6
4

184
303
380
118
223
78
35

112
60
219
38
90
41
18

30

831

111

215
34
162

90
20
21

15

130

59

139
23
135
7

2,987
423
3,273

2,934
286
198
0

CARROLL COUNTY-REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY
CHARLES COUNTY-REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY
HARFORD COUNTY
1
7
2
8
3
4
4
4

NO INFORMATION FILED
26
68
20
5
5
33

MONTGOMERY COUNTY
1
2
3
4

8
5
5

NO
NO
NO
NO

INFORMATION
INFORMATION
INFORMATION
INFORMATION

FILED
FILED
FILED
FILED

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

23
6
20
8
40
8

8
RELATED TO NO.6
35
75
16
8

--:!68

SOMERSET COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY
TALBOT COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY
WICOMICO COUNTY
2

15

• Corresponds to same number on reports by judges.

16-

31

12
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REPORTS BY PROSECUTING OFFICERS
NUMBER OF

COSTS
Total
($)
RELATED
RELATED
$ 4,250
RELATED
$11,547
RELATED
$ 1,150

Other than
Manpower
($)
TO NO.3
TO NO.5
$ 250
TO NO.5
$ 203
TO NO.7
$ 150

$ 2,014

$ 1,425
$ 1,332
$ 205
$ 180

Persons
Arrested

Trials

22

21

10

PENDING

3

3

7

PENDING

$ 105
$ 100

4

$

1

25

o

$ 2,000

$ 350

4

$29,758
$ 2,000
$36,848
$ 1,501

$1,050
$ 350
$ 674
$ 61

34

$ 1,170

$ 150

2

9
13
0

Motions to
Suppress
Intercepts

PENDING
PENDING
PENDING
PENDING

RELATED TO NO.8

PENDING

Persons
Convicted

21

3
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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
PURSUANT TO § 1()-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31,1977
REPORTS BY JUDGES

Reporting
Number·

Court

Official Authorizing
Application

Offense Specified

Attorney General

BriberyIExtortion

BALTIMORE CITY
Criminal Court of
9
Baltimore

REPORTS BY PROSECUTING OFFICERS

Reporting
Number

Number of

Average

Days
in
Operation

Number of
Intercepts
per Day

Conversations
of Individuals
Intercepted

Intercepts

Incriinating
Intercepts

5

8

64

2

NUMBER OF

BALTIMORE CITY
9

23

• Corresponds to same number on report by prosecuting officer_
1 TYPE: PW = Phone wire_
2 LOCATION: B = Business location_
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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
PURSUANT TO § lo-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31,1977
REPORTS BY JUDGES
AUTHORIZED LENGTH
Type
of
Intercept!

PW

Location"

Date of
Application

Original
Order
(Days)

B

11/20177

26

Number of
Extensions

Total
Length
(Days)

26

REPORTS BY PROSECUTING OFFICERS
COST

NUMBER OF

Total

Other than
Manpower

($)

($)

$750

$50

* Corresponds

Persons
Arrested

Trials

INVESTIGATION CONTINUING

to same number on report by prosecuting officer.
TYPE: PW = Phone wire.
" LOCATION: B = Business location.
1

Motions to
Suppress
Intercepts

Persons
Convicted
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STATE-WIDE SUMMARY OF WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR JULY 1 DECEMBER 31, 1977
OFFENSE

LOCATION

Gambling - 23 (85.2%)

14 ( 51.9%)

Phone Wiretap

Microphone/eavesdrop -

27 (100.0%)

4 ( 14.8%)
5 ( 18.5%)
3( 11.1%)
1 ( 3.7%)
27 (100.0%)

CONVERSATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
INTERCEPTED

INTERCEPTS

INCRIMINATING INTERCEPTS

562

9,675

4,309 (44.53% of Total
Intercepts)

Narcotics
Murder

3 (11.1%)
1 ( 3.7%)

Single Family Dwelling
Apartment
Business
Pay Phone
Not Reported

TYPE OF DEVICE
- 26( 96.3%)
1 ( 3.7%)

27 (100.0%)

ARRESTS DURING PERIOD

CONVICTIONS·

III

24

• NOTE: IT SHOULD BE OBSERVED THAT MANY OF THOSE ARRESTED ARE STILL PENDING
TRIAL.

